Fault modeling is an important step towards both understanding and validating the implemented system. The focus of the paper is to present a unified system fault modelling framework, including input related faults model based on system theory. The complex embedded system (CES) is modelled using sequence of communicating FSM (SCFSM) and the system faults are represented by two components of system fault vector -system behaviour fault vector and system communication fault vector. These two system fault vector components are related and are components of the "change parameter vector Θ", a general system level fault model based on Dynamic system theory. Input related faults are defined and their contribution is discussed. Faults propagation in mixed hardware software communication architecture is discussed, with the help of protocol example.
INTRODUCTION
The Embedded systems (ES) design and testing process are very challenging [1] . The growing system complexity and application domain demands are directly impacting the validation and or verification issues. Fault-based testing focuses on generating tests to detect particular faults, which is an important advantage compared to other testing approaches [2] . The two popular testing strategies, viz. conformance and composition testing rely on specific fault models [2] . The resulting tests are also effective in detecting faults in other classes [3] . Fault modeling is an important step towards development of tests. To efficiently test any system, it is important to know the possible failures, causes and the way they propagate. The first step is the identification and classification of design faults that occur during the early developmental stages. In general, fault taxonomy is the starting point for providing techniques and methods for assessing the quality [4] .
Faults of a system can be classified by the phase in which they occur as follows: design faults or errors which appear in the design phase, fabrication faults which appear in the manufacturing phase, and operational faults which occur during normal operation. The focus of the paper is to present a unified system fault (USF) modelling framework, including input related fault model based on system theory. The CES is modelled using sequence of communicating FSM (SCFSM) and the system faults are defined by two components of system fault vector -system behaviour fault vector and system communication fault vector. These two system fault vector components are related and are components of the "change parameter vector Θ", a general system level fault (change) model which is based on Dynamic system theory [5] . Input related faults and their contribution to system fault vector are discussed. The USF model formalism is presented in section 3 which depicts the two types of system fault(s) and their relation with already reported embedded system fault models. Section 4 deals with faults propagation in mixed hardware software (MHS) communication architectures.
RELATED WORK
Fault modeling is an important aspect for the development of tests for systems. The functional test generation considers mainly two classes of fault models: Behavioral and Functional fault models. Fault models were developed and applied in different domains like Embedded Systems [6] [7] ; Software [4, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ; and digital hardware systems including VLSI [13] [14] . Testing at higher level of abstraction has a lot in common with software testing [6] . The test pattern generation methods can be classified into two main categories, namely, code oriented methods and fault oriented methods. A two-level fault model [6] is described to specify not only the control flow but also the data flow aspects for embedded system testing, based on simple FSMs and the extension of FSMs, i.e. with (p)-EFSM model. Apart from control flow faults [6] , other error classes that are not represented by this model are similar to those of software [6] : Specific behavioural error classes and General data flowrelated error classes. A timing fault model, the Mis-Timed Event (MTE) fault model, is proposed [7] to model timing-induced functional errors for analysing complex systems.
Software errors, their relationship with the development phase and system complexity are presented [8] [9] . The results presented [9] are, (i) conditional faults (ii) operating faults and (iii) erroneous requirements are highly related with safetyrelated software errors. In several embedded software applications errors in understanding requirements and implementations are major sources of errors [9] [10] . Software fault taxonomy for using in the development and evaluation of software in component-based systems is presented in [4] . Component-based software systems are classified into two main classes of faults: service and structure-related faults [4] . These two classes are further categorized into seven type's viz., Syntactic, Semantic, Non-Functional, Connectors, Infrastructure, Topology and Other faults. A fault class hierarchy that relates literal, term, operator, and expression faults classes used in specification-based software testing is reported [11] . A test case that detects a fault of a stronger class will always detect the corresponding fault of a weaker class amongst the hierarchy. Though the study of faults was carried for Boolean specifications, the results are equally applicable to the code-based testing of predicates [11] . During software integration testing the emphasis is on interactions among modules via their interfaces. Four types of Integration Error (IE) occur when an incorrect value is passed through a module connection [12] .To efficiently test any mixed hardware-software system in the design phase, it is important to know the possible failures and their causes.
Models of physical and fabrication faults [13] are commonly required for testing of digital electronic circuits or cores. A survey of behavioural level fault models for testing of cores (SOC) at higher level of abstraction than logic level is given in [13] . The survey indicates that a large number of fault models were developed for validating the designs in IC domain. To model a physical fault inside component like ALU, knowledge of the logic level implementation of the component is required. The co-validation fault models [14] are behavioural-level fault models that are classified by the style of behavioural description upon which the models are based. A co-validation fault model allows the concise representation of the set of all design defects for an arbitrary design. For Hardware functional verification, high-level faults are mapped into logic-level faults and correspondence between behavioural / RT level signals and logic-level nets established. The current co-validation fault models are classified based on the style of behavioural description as textual, control-data flow, state machine, gate level, application-specific, and interface faults [14] .
The issue of error-propagation conditions was considered [15] in terms of 'impact' on the program execution in causing a detectable output error, using the notion of 'impact strength' as a quantitative measure of the impact. The paper introduced dynamic impact analysts' technique to determine the effect of components of program on the program output. The paper is on USF modelling framework, including input related fault model based on system theory. Faults propagation to lower level hardware faults in mixed hardware software architectures is discussed for protocol example.
COMPLEX EMBEDDED SYSTEM MODEL
The elements of any complex embedded system (CES) are an external process and an Embedded Processing Component (EPC) (hardware component board consisting of at least one dedicated processor, memory, special interface circuit and optionally may contain sensors and actuators). Sensors provide information about the current state of the external process, while actuators communicate to the external process the results (actions) of computing "controller law". The external process, which is known a priori, is a process that can be of physical, mechanical, or electrical nature; is controlled and implemented in real time by mixed hardware software or hardware only. The available strategies for simplifying a complex system in general are: abstraction, partition and segmentation.
The embedded system specification consists of the specification of its environment (external process) and it's EPC, in some formal notation, like state transition model [6] 
The complex embedded system XS, with the above assumptions, can be represented as ); ...
where the product sign represents the sequence. The embedded system can be broadly divided into two orthogonal operations: computations and communications. These operations are separated in two types of components [18] : applications and interfaces, and communications to and from these types of components are indicated in figure1. The pointto-point communications from 'applications' are denoted as orders and results; and from 'interfaces' as requests and responses. For example port_ send (port, data, size, mode) and port_ receive (port, data, size, mode) orders of applications which the interface will execute.
The system partitioning and the design of the communication will be the most important tasks that will greatly influence the performance of the whole system. The various abstraction levels of embedded system components (from implementation point of view) are given in table-I. It is to be noted that partioning is not possible when the CES has emergent properties and Segmentation is difficult, if not impossible, for highly concurrent processes and associated behaviour. In the next section system level fault model is defined, based on CSFSM representation. 
UNIFIED EMBEDDED SYSTEM FAULT MODEL
In section 3 the complex embedded system XS, is represented as
where the product sign represents the sequence. A "linear fault operator L" can be defined that modifies the operations of individual component machine A i either the behaviour [6, [16] [17] or alternately modifies the events of communicating channel [19] [20] [21] between the faultfree, communicating component machines A i and A j . Formally combinations of these two operations are also can be defined on XS. For simplicity, "fault operators" on behaviour and communication channel only are considered in this work. The effect of linear "fault operator L" on the system can be written as:
The faulty behaviour of FSM is another FSM known as mutation machine [16] . Therefore a fault relative to some F be defined as any mutation of F, say F', such that F ≠ F' and the fault model be a set = F F of such all possible modified FSM's, is the fault domain. In general a fault model is defined as [16] 
the fault domain. Representing the Mutation Operator by "Ψ" its effect on the system XS can be written as:
Assuming that the operations of "Mutation Operator Ψ" on each of the component machines are disjoint and denoting the operations of "Mutation Operator Ψ" on each of the component machines by ψ i the overall effect on the system can be written as
The effect of ψ i on individual component machine A i can be the error prone version of that machine the 'mutation machine A i '. The mutation machine may have any of the possible faults [16] : transition has an output fault, transfer fault, missing state and an additional state.
and calling it as the subsystem or EPC behaviour fault (EBF) vector; the equation (4) describes the sequence of mutation machines in the given system. Alternately, the machine can be assumed to be fault free and the fault(s) if any can be incorporated in the communication channel (or link) between the machines [19] [20] [21] . This is similar to separating and encapsulating communication and the computation [19] . It suffices to consider communication channel fault (CCF) and assume fault-free component machines. The assumption of the component machine being fault free is very useful since it allows to completely ignoring the internal structure. Based on functionality the subsystem (level) faults can be further categorized into three groups [19] [20] Following same lines, the operations of "Fault Operator-Φ" on the system XS can be written as
Let V i and Z j be the communication channels between the two machines A i and A j , then assuming the effect of "faulty process Φ" on the communication channels (i →j) and (j → i) are independent and may be denoted by
. Using this effect of fault operator can be written as:
The effect of communication channel "Fault Operator-Φ" on the system XS can be represented as:
The above equation (7) can be rewritten as:
as the subsystem communication channel fault (CCF) vector, equation (8) describes the sequence of CFSMs interconnected by faulty communication channels. This model can support multiple channel faults, by associating several ports with the "Fault Operator-Φ", modelling interactions between several channels and/or processes. Equations (5) and (9) indicate that the effect of the "linear fault operator's Ψ and Φ" respectively is to divide the overall system faults, into two hierarchical . The system level fault model is based on Dynamic system theory [5] which assumes that models of the system is available and considers that all the events like -deviation, change, failure, fault, damage and malfunction, are incorporated by a change in the parameter vector of a model of the system. Referring to Fig.3 neglecting the dynamics for the moment, the observed data Y can be expressed as:
Input U is assumed to be known (measured). The unknown quantity W s stands for non-measured inputs, unknown nonstationary excitation or perturbation of the system, and input noise. The unknown quantity W o stands for output noise. If the system is error free, then the output noise W o depends on W s only. Equation (10) shows three types of faults: the first two types of faults o and i are additive type and appropriately model some faults due to sensors and actuators. The third type of faults modeled by the change in the parameter Θ, is often referred as component or system faults.
These systems (processes) can be static or dynamic, linear or nonlinear. They are all subject to component faults. In the case of linear dynamic systems, it is useful to assume that faults as multiplicative faults, because they affect the input-output transfer function in a multiplicative manner [5] . Equation 10 is the starting point for fault diagnosis and isolation of dynamic systems.
Input Related Faults
The cause-effect analysis [9] shows that conditional faults, operating faults and erroneous requirements are the main contributors of of safety related software faults. Erroneous requirements and operation faults are required to be identified and resolved very early as they warrant modification of software [10] else they create safety related problems. Conditional faults are closely related to limit values. The two input related faults that are due to conditional faults are: input domain fault and input bound-limit fault.
Input Domain fault
The system XS, can also be represented as a set of function or mappings according to some group of specifications, Spec, from a set of input values (its domain, D) to a set of output values (its range, R), as shown in figure 4 . A system which implements specification Spec should also map from D to R. For real numbers R will be m-dimensional space of real numbers -R m . However for CES the external process is known, which is physical process and under the control of a MHS platform. All physical processes are required to be controlled within certain limits, and as such restrict the input to specific bounds in the This certainly arises among complex systems that have more than one operation modes, like Radar, Sonar or Missile and also software initiating fault referred as mode confusion [22] , an automation design related problem. The application domain dictates the nature or criticality of its effect. This is also similar to the idea of Application Domain Modeling or Input validation analysis [23] and Data Mutation. For obtaining an insight into the nature of program faults, a distinction between the syntactic and the semantic nature of faults is drawn [4] . Obviously, semantic fault size depends on the input domain and output range. For example, if a program P computes on the domain-D F produces faulty result R F contain values both in R B and outside R U . Note that the domain and the range can be considered for an entire program, an individual program component, a program path or simply a single program location.
Input bound-limit faults
For physical systems the input values are required to be limited to certain bounds in their range of values: called input bound limits. For a CES, any variation of input that causes one or more input bound limits to be violated is defined as an input boundlimit fault. The input bound-limit violation may be due to any input parameter that is specified, including time. A p-dimension bound vector, λi, represents the variations in the limits of the input U. A set of these vectors, Λ = {λ1, λ2 . . . λN}, define the bounds limit in the input vector U. The mapping of the input vector 'u i ', to the output vector 'y i ' is given by y i = f (u i ). MASK signal, for M=4 is shown in figure 5 . Figure 5 shows the 4-ASK signal sequence generated by the binary sequence 00 01 1011. The carrier frequency f c and amplitude D i have tolerances as per the application. Typical tolerance for amplitude D and frequency f c are 1%. Beyond tolerance limits the detected binary data will not be recognized and resulting in malfunction. This application shows tolerance of even time duration T.
The violation of timing constraints on signals within a complex system can create timing-induced functional errors which alter the value of output signals without affecting output signal timing. One such error is Mis-Timed Event (MTE) [7] fault and it is 'association of pair of signals' at the 'wrong-time' resulting in receiving 'faulty-data'. This is communication channel output data 'timing association error' for subsequent use. Similar design error is possible in data exchange protocols between any two processes or tasks. The input related faults may trigger or contribute to either of the system fault vector components. But the communication fault vector is logical choice for analyzing input related faults, as the region of acceptability R' a is defined in the physical output space. Naturally the input noise component W s generally add up and adversely affect the region of acceptability. Sensors and actuators are likely to develop malfunction more due to input related faults. Several software program defects, like array or string function, are related to improperly bound inputs. An example of this type of defect is the buffer overflow -where memory outside of the intended buffer (or array) is accessed. For example, many arrays are created dynamically meaning that the size is only known at run-time. In addition to the required data value, the proper path is also necessary, to ensure that the array reference is executed. Complete software verification for arbitrary programs with unbounded memory is un-decidable.
FAULTS PROPAGATION
For preventing fault propagation, the requirements are [24] , "abstractions and models are stable even in case of failures (error containment principle)", which implies partioning of system into independent fault containment units. Generally the error containment principle is violated in systems other than Fault Tolerant Systems, allowing fault propagation. In such case the fault diagnosis may be performed at lower levels of abstraction [24] . Faults propagation will be analyzed with reference to different levels of communication abstractions of the embedded systems, shown in table-I. Design faults, hardware, software or HSI; affect various levels of system hierarchy in the target MHS platform (TMP) architecture. The error occurrence to fault manifestation is highly implementation dependent.
In section 3 the embedded system operations are separated in to two types of components, [18] : applications and interfaces, as shown in figure1.Though errors are possible in both 'computations and communications' operations, their propagation greatly depends on implementation of the 'communications architectures' and for this reason the CCF model defined in section3 is very useful for testing. Critical part in embedded system is the hw/sw interactions that are governed by communication and interfacing architectures. Communication includes protocols, physical interfaces and physical channels that carry data and control. One of the general system level communication primitive operations are: port_ send (port, data, size, mode) and port_ receive (port, data, size, mode).They are example ORDERS of an application.
In the TMP architecture the implementation choices are: (i) hardware (ii) and hardware-software (mixed). The communication primitive like the port_ send ( ) and port_ receive ( ) can be implemented using the SEND and RECEIVE functions. To obtain an insight into the hw/sw interaction, and its propagation through the hw/sw communication, a simple synchronous wait protocol example is considered. The synchronous protocol is sufficient to bring out the hw/sw interaction issues very clearly.
The synchronous wait protocol
The synchronous wait protocol shown in figure 6 . Though it is simple the completion of communication is certain and one item per cycle data transfer takes between the two functional modules. The SEND and RECEIVE together synchronize the communication by a pair of 'SndRd and RcvRd' signals, as shown in Figure 6 . The timing diagram shows that both are ready in the same state. But in practice either of them may have to wait for one more cycle and the sender has to ensure the data remains valid during those cycles on the data bus. Note both modules initiate the transfer of data and there is no notion of master / slave. This protocol is widely used in asynchronous circuit implementations and can also be used with a synchronous 
Hardware implementation
One possible SEND-function block implementation for an 8-bit data, using 74xxx541 buffer / driver with tri-state outputs, device is given in Figure 7 . In this case, there is a direct data connection between SEND and RECEIVE. The implementation assumes that two independent 'SndRd and RcvRd' signal-wires are available. It is further assumed that 74xxx541buffer/driver I0-I7 pins are connected to the source-data-bus or the block itself is generating data. The two inverters (from 7406 or equivalent) use the independent signal-wires 'SndRd and RcvRd' for generating OE1bar and OE2 bar control signals, as shown in figure 7 . If data is required to be latched for reading by RECEIVE-function, then the buffer can be replaced with 8-bit octal transparent D-latch (74x573 or its equivalent). RECEIVEfunction can be implemented similarly. If data is valid for rising edge of clock then 8-bit octal transparent positive edge triggered D-latch (74x574 or its equivalent) can be used.
The generation of independent 'SndRd and RcvRd' signal becomes important, as the remaining devices are fairly reliable and mal-function is expected after long use only. The devices are expected to develop "stuck-at-1 or 0" type of faults, in general, after fair use. However such faults are easily detected during independent hardware tests. The RECEIVE block hardware implementation is similar. The independent generation of 'SndRd and RcvRd' signals, if error prone, fault is generated.
Synchronous hardware-software implementation
The hardware component of the synchronous input interface is made up of the flag and the input bus interface is similar to the tri-state buffer described. The software component of the synchronous interface reads data from the hardware component, and can be declared as a procedure Rcv_synch_rd (v, c, RD) where the parameter v is the holder of the input message, c is the selected address and RD is a control signal for reading. The software module of the synchronous interface reads data from the hardware component of figure 8 and RD is a control signal for reading.
Here, the software program waits for the flag 'FRd' to be set to indicate availability of an input data on the data Bus. The 'RcvRd' signal is connected to both HW and SW components and shown as can be reset by RD, to be consistent with the example. The reset wire of the flag is linked to the control wire 'OE', which is driven by the control signal RD. For implementing the example protocol 'SndRd' is connected to 'S' and the 'soft-module' reads the flag-FRd; and also generates 'RcvRd' signal. The generation of 'RD' for reading operation will reset the flag-FRd and the 'RcvRd' signal. Any error in the 'soft-module' prevents input data from hardware component. Apart from timing considerations, initialization of hardware and sequencing of software is important, for error generation. It is possible that the 'flag-FRd' is already set before HW component initiated SEND operation, resulting in reading wrong data or preventing in sending data.
Mixed hardware -software communication architectures
More general system level communication primitive operations are: port_ send (port, data, size, mode) and port_ receive (port, data, size, mode). Based on the design partitioning, the interface need to connect two hardware modules, two software modules, or hardware and a software module. In the case where two processes that communicate through ports are mapped to hardware implementation (as in section 4.2), code or software is not involved in handling specific communication. Hardware to software communications can be implemented by either interrupts or using memory-mapped addresses for the polling case. One solution is shown in Figure 10 . The bus adaptation layer for the hardware module sends and receives data from the bus. In the case of a memory-mapped communication, a device driver is also required to reside in the processor, for monitoring the bus for activity in the memory-mapped region. The device driver is responsible for transferring data from the bus to the processor memory, to a port structure. The software process will access the port data structure retrieving data and updating event flags. The application programs communicate with the external world via function calls to the appropriate send and receive operations. The send and receive routines are implemented using the memory "read" and "write" instructions if memory mapped I/O RECEIVE is used for the specific channel, or the corresponding special programmed I/O instructions if instruction programmed I/O is used. For interrupt-driven I/O service routine scheme, the "send" and "receive" routines in software are each split into two operations. In the case of a "send" operation, the processor transfers the data to the I/O unit and proceeds with other tasks. After completion only the "receive" operation is initiated. The direct memory access is similar to the single "send" and "receive" operations above, but parameterized for block transfers. In the interrupt-based communication, the actual data is still transferred through a memory-mapped location to the port structure.
Discussion on communication architectures
In the previous section SEND block and communication primitive implementations are described. Referring to occur when an incorrect value is passed through a module connection [12] . The incorrect hardware software interaction passes through hw/sw communication and results into a fault at the various interface architectures used in the application. It is also possible that error propagation can be prevented by the intermediary states, either by ignoring the fault or mapping it to a proper state [15] . As such integration tests are to be designed to identify faults. Hence system level functional tests created to verify the system design will be able to detect errors in software and assure correct function [10] . Careful design of functional tests and proper reuse of the same tests during integration are likely to give better results.
Table1. Embedded system levels of abstraction
Hardware [25] Software [26] Computation [27] Communication 
CONCLUSIONS
A hierarchical unified system fault (USF) modelling framework is proposed for the MHS platform. The complex embedded system (CES) is modelled using sequence of communicating FSM (SCFSM) and the system faults are represented by two components of system fault vector -system behaviour fault vector and system communication fault vector. These two component system fault vectors are related to the "change 
